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ABSTRACT: This case note examines the Opinion issued on 14 February 2017 by the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Justice on the nature of the competence of the European Union 
to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are 
Blind. The case note first presents the arguments of the parties involved in the proceedings and 
subsequently summarises the opinions of AG Wahl and the Grand Chamber. In the commentary 
section, the case note examines the Court’s treatment of the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception. It 
argues that, despite the Court’s embrace of a broad reading of the ERTA doctrine, the exception 
remains good law; it thus allows the Member States to incur international  legal commitments, 
provided that both pre-existing common EU rules and the proposed international legal commitments 
establish minimum requirements. Other interesting aspects of the ruling - in particular the Court’s 
treatment of the Commission’s first line of argument related to the common commercial policy - are 
not discussed in this case note, and are left to another occasion.  
KEYWORDS: EU external relations law, EU constitutional law, EU treaty-making, Marrakesh 
Treaty, exclusive competence of the EU, common commercial policy, minimum harmonisation. 
SUMMARY: I. Introduction II. The arguments of the parties III. The opinion of AG Wahl IV. The 
opinion of the Grand Chamber V. Commentary: the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception remains 
good law. 
 
DICTAMEN 3/15 SOBRE EL TRATADO DE MARRAKECH: EL TJUE 
CONFIRMA LA EXCEPCIÓN DE LA “ARMONIZACIÓN MÍNIMA” AL 
PRINCIPIO AETR. COMENTARIO SOBRE EL DICTAMEN 3/15 (TRATADO DE 
MARRAKESH) 
RESUMEN: En este comentario se analiza el Dictamen emitido por la Gran Sala del Tribunal de 
Justicia de la UE, el 14 de febrero de 2017, sobre la competencia de la UE para celebrar el Tratado 
de Marrakech para facilitar el acceso a las obras publicadas a las personas ciegas, con 
discapacidad visual o con otras dificultades para acceder al texto impreso. En primer término, se 
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presentan los argumentos de las partes que intervinieron en el procedimiento y, a continuación, se 
resumen tanto las conclusiones del Abogado General Wahl como el pronunciamiento de la Gran 
Sala. En la sección de análisis, el comentario se centra en el tratamiento dispensado por el 
Tribunal a la excepción de “armonización mínima”. Se constata cómo, pese a decantarse por una 
interpretación amplia de la doctrina AETR, el Tribunal confirma la vigencia de esta excepción que 
permite a los Estados miembros asumir compromisos internacionales siempre que, tanto estos, 
como las normas ya existentes en ese campo en el ordenamiento jurídico de la Unión, establezcan 
requerimientos mínimos. Otros aspectos interesantes del Dictamen, como la reacción del Tribunal 
frente a la línea argumental de la Comisión en relación con la política comercial común, no son 
objeto de análisis en este comentario. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: relaciones exteriores de la UE, Derecho constitucional de la UE, 
capacidad de la UE para celebrar tratados internacionales, Acuerdo de Marrakesh, competencia 
exclusiva de la UE, política comercial común, armonización mínima. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On Valentine’s Day 2017, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
issued Opinion 3/15 on the division of competences between the EU and its Member 
States to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for 
Persons Who Are Blind.
1
 
Worldwide, 285 million people are visually impaired.
2
 Only five percent of all 
publications published annually are made available and accessible to visually impaired 
people, leading the World Blind Union to speak of a ‘book famine.’
3
 The Marrakesh Treaty 
aims to resolve this famine, first, by requiring parties to the agreement to provide for 
exceptions and limitations to copyright laws which would stimulate the production of 
copies of published works adapted to the needs of visually impaired people and, second, 
by providing for rules that aim at facilitating the cross-border exchange of such works. By 
doing so, more visually impaired people in a greater number of countries would get 
access to books. This, in turn, would increase their autonomy and contribute to their 
integration into the wider society. The World Blind Union has praised the Treaty as 
                                                 
1
 The text of the treaty can be found here: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/marrakesh/ 
<accessed 2 April 2017>. 
2
 In this sense, see Fact Sheet Nr 282, available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs282/en/ <accessed 24 March 2017>. In what follows, 
the term ‘visual impairment’ will be used to refer both to blindness and to limited visual abilities.  
3
 See e.g. http://www.worldblindunion.org/English/our-work/our-priorities/Pages/On-Track-For-A-
Book-Without-Borders.aspx <accessed 20 March 2017>.  
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perhaps the most important step towards integrating visually impaired individuals into 
society since the invention of Braille.  
A final text was adopted on 27 June 2013 during a diplomatic conference in the city of 
Marrakesh. The European Commission participated in the negotiations on behalf of the 
European Union, after being authorised to do so by a Council decision of 26 November 
2012.
4
 The ratification process has taken quite some time. Three years after the adoption 
of the text, on 30 June 2016, Canada was the twentieth country to ratify the agreement, 
allowing it to come into force on 20 September 2016. 
By a decision of 14 April 2014, the Council authorised the signing of the agreement on 
behalf of the EU.
5
 The decision was adopted based on Articles 114 TFEU (internal 
market) and 207 TFEU (common commercial policy). On 21 October of the same year, 
the Commission submitted to the Council a proposal to conclude the agreement.
6
 The 
proposal relied on the same substantive legal bases as the Council decision adopted a 
few months earlier, i.e. a combination of Articles 114 and 207 TFEU. 
The Commission defended this choice for a double legal basis on two grounds. First, it 
considered by that ‘the cross-border exchange of accessible-format copies with third 
countries is a predominant element of the Treaty, therefore its relevant articles fall under 
the common commercial policy (Article 207 TFEU).’ Second, it held that ‘the articles of 
the Treaty on mandatory exceptions or limitations fall within the scope of EU law, affect or 
alter the scope of the common rules, namely those in Directive 2001/29/EC and in any 
event are within an area which is already largely covered by EU rules (Article 114 
TFEU).’
7
  
In terms of decision-making procedures, the Commission proposal thus envisaged a 
procedure in which parliamentary consent would be required and the Council could adopt 
the decision by means of a qualified majority vote. Furthermore, by calling for a 
combination of a priori exclusivity based on Article 207 TFEU and an ERTA effect (cf. the 
reference to ‘affect or alter the scope of the common rules), the Commission envisaged 
                                                 
4
 Council Decision on the participation of the European Union in negotiations for an international 
agreement within the World Intellectual Property Organisation on improved access to books for 
print impaired persons; 16259/12 EU RESTRICTED. 
5
 Council Decision of 14 April 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the 
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually 
Impaired, or otherwise Print Disabled (2014/221/EU), OJ L 115, 17.4.2014, p. 1-2. 
6
 Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the 
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually 
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, COM/2014/0638 final.  
7
 See the explanatory memorandum attached to the Proposal referred to in footnote 6. 
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the agreement as an EU-only agreement, to be adopted on the basis of the EU’s 
exclusive competences. 
In contrast to the decision to sign the agreement, the proposal to conclude the 
agreement faced stiff opposition within the Council from several Member States, with 
Germany and Italy allegedly acting as driving forces behind efforts at garnering sufficient 
support to form a blocking minority.
8
  
Presumably in an effort to break Member State resistance, on 11 August 2015 the 
Commission requested the ECJ to issue an opinion on the issue of the nature of the 
competence of the EU to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty.
9
 The request to issue an 
opinion was in itself remarkable, as the legal services of all three EU institutions - not only 
those of the Commission and European Parliament, but also the legal service of the 
Council - according to one source agreed that the Marrakesh Treaty fell within the scope 
of the EU’s exclusive competences.
10
 Interestingly, and with hindsight perhaps 
unfortunately, as will become clear below, the Commission did not request the Court to 
determine the appropriate legal basis or bases for the agreement.   
During the course of the proceedings before the ECJ, the dead-lock within the Council 
did not get resolved, leading the European Parliament in its session of 3 February 2016 
to issue a resolution in which it ‘[n]ote[d] with profound indignation that seven EU Member 
States have formed a minority block which is impeding the process of ratifying the Treaty’ 
and ‘call[ed] on the Council and the Member States to accelerate the ratification process, 
without making ratification conditional upon revision of the EU legal framework or the 
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union.’
11
 
                                                 
8
 In this sense, see Intellectual Property Watch, ‘Brief: Germany, Italy Leading Resistance To EU 
Ratification Of Marrakesh Treaty, Blind Union Says’, 10 December 2015, available at 
https://www.ip-watch.org/2015/12/10/germany-italy-leading-resistance-to-eu-ratification-of-
marrakesh-treaty-blind-union-says/ <accessed 20 March 2017>. 
9
 See the answer by Commissioner Oettinger to a question asked by MEP Marc Tarabella, where 
the Commissioner referred to the disagreement on the nature of the EU’s competence as the main 
reason behind the deadlock within the Council (E-005801/2016, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2016-
005801&language=EN <accessed 20 march 2017>.  
10
 In this sense, see a blog post by MEP Indrek Tarland, where he held that ‘[s]urprisingly enough, 
every lawyer involved in the dispute over competences both at the Commission and at the Council 
agree that this treaty falls under exclusive European Union competence. Let me repeat: the lawyers 
agreed.’ (available at http://eptoday.com/the-marrakesh-treaty-for-the-blind-a-call-for-action/ 
<accessed 21 March 2017>).  
11
 European Parliament resolution of 3 February 2016 on the ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty, 
based on petitions received, notably Petition 924/2011 (2016/2542(RSP)), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-
0037&language=EN&ring=B8-2016-0168 <accessed 20 March 2017>. 
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On 8 September 2016, Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion. The opinion of 
the Court was issued on Valentine’s Day 2017, i.e. nearly five months after the coming 
into force of the agreement. At the time of writing, the EU has not yet concluded the 
Treaty. 
This case note first presents the arguments of the parties involved in the proceedings - 
in which the Council did not actively intervene - and subsequently summarises the 
opinions of AG Wahl and the Grand Chamber. In doing so, it sets out the legal arguments 
advanced by the different parties and draws attention to the political dynamics at play. In 
the commentary section, the case note examines the Court’s treatment of the ‘minimum 
harmonisation’ exception. It argues that, despite the Court’s embrace of a broad reading 
of the ERTA doctrine, the exception remains good law; it thus allows the Member States 
to incur international  legal commitments, provided that both pre-existing common EU 
rules and the proposed international legal commitments establish minimum requirements. 
Other interesting aspects of the ruling - in particular the Court’s treatment of the 
Commission’s first line of argument related to the common commercial policy - are not 
discussed in this case note, and are left to another occasion.  
II. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
The Commission’s arguments in favour of exclusivity 
The Commission argued (together with the Parliament and the Lithuanian 
government) that the Marrakesh Treaty fell within the scope of the exclusive 
competences of the EU. It presented to the Court two alternative lines of argument, one 
focussed on bringing the Marrakesh Treaty within the scope of the EU’s exclusive 
competence to conduct a common commercial policy as provided for in Article 207 TFEU 
iuncto Article 3(1) TFEU, the other focussed on convincing the Court that the Marrakesh 
Treaty has been covered by an ERTA effect, in the sense that the EU has acquired an 
exclusive external competence to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty because the conclusion 
of the international agreement ‘may affect common rules or alter their scope’ in the 
meaning of Article 3(2) in fine TFEU.  
The Commission first aimed to fit the Marrakesh Treaty within the definition of the 
CCP as articulated by the ECJ in its Daiichi Sankyo judgment, where it had held that ‘a 
European Union act falls within the common commercial policy if it relates specifically to 
international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade 
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and has direct and immediate effects on trade.’
12
 In the Commission’s view, the 
Marrakesh Treaty intends to do exactly that, i.e. to facilitate, by harmonising the legal 
regime covering the production and exchange of accessible format copies of published 
works, the cross-border exchange of such copies. The fact that the accessible format 
copies are produced and exchanged on a non-profit basis did not affect this conclusion, 
the Commission held, as Article 207 TFEU also applies when goods or services are 
supplied on a non-profit basis. Similarly, the fact that the ‘ultimate objective’ of the Treaty 
is of a social or humanitarian nature did not undermine its argument, the Commission 
contended, as the Court has held in the past that the presence of non-trade related 
specific objectives does not stand in the way of characterising a measure as falling within 
the scope of the CCP. 
Regarding the ERTA principle, the Commission argued that because copyright and 
related rights have been harmonised at EU level by Directive 2001/29, the area covered 
by the Marrakesh Treaty is covered by an ERTA effect, which means that Member States 
are precluded as a matter of EU law from becoming a party to the agreement. Central to 
the Commission’s argument was the point that the exceptions and limitations provided by 
the Marrakesh Treaty ought to be understood as authorisations by EU law for the 
Member States to provide such exceptions or limitations. In doing so, the Commission 
argued, the Member States acted on the basis of EU law, not on the basis of a form of 
‘retained’ competence. 
The Member States’ arguments against exclusivity 
The Member States - in particular the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Hungary, 
Romania, Finland and the United Kingdom - contested both the CCP and the ERTA 
arguments advanced by the Commission, and instead were of the view that the 
Marrakesh Treaty at least in part fell outside of the scope of the EU’s exclusive powers. 
This view implied that the agreement ought to be adopted in the form of a mixed 
agreement, as the EU would lack sufficient competence to conclude the agreement in its 
entirety.  
Regarding the CCP argument, the Member State governments contended that the 
Marrakesh Treaty had neither as its subject matter nor as its purpose the liberalisation or 
promotion of international trade in the meaning of the Daiichi Sankyo judgment. As for the 
purpose, most governments agreed that the agreement aimed to ‘promote equal 
opportunities and social inclusion for persons with disabilities.’ The French government 
                                                 
12
 Judgment in Daiichi Sankyo, C-414/11, EU:C:2013:520, para. 51. 
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added that the Treaty could also be understood as having a development aim: by 
facilitating the production and cross-border exchange of accessible format copies, the 
Treaty contributes to the development of the nations in which the ‘book famine’ is most 
acute, it argued. As for the content of the agreement, most Member States argued that 
the exchanges covered by the Treaty are non-commercial and thus fall outside of the 
scope of the CCP, precisely because they take place in the framework of several 
exceptions and limitations to the ordinary commercial publication and exchange of 
published works.  
Regarding the ERTA argument, the Member States adopted a ‘retail’ as opposed to a 
‘wholesale’ approach, whereby they argued that individual provisions of the Marrakesh 
Treaty are not covered by an ERTA effect. They justified this approach with a reference to 
language used by the ECJ e.g. in Opinion 1/03, where it held that the ERTA analysis 
must be grounded in a ‘comprehensive and detailed’ analysis of the agreement and EU 
law.  
This provision-specific approach led several Member State governments to consider 
that the provisions requiring the Member States to provide for exceptions and limitations 
to copyright rights ought to be understood as forms of ‘retained’ Member State 
competence not affected by an ERTA effect. This would be the case, they argued, 
because internal EU legislation - particularly Directive 2001/29 - did not regulate the 
introduction of such exceptions and limitations; it merely provided for the possibility for 
Member States to introduce such exceptions and limitations, they argued. In this sense, 
these Member States understood EU law as having provided for a form of ‘minimum 
harmonisation’, whereby the Member States could ‘go further’ than EU law had ventured 
to go, in this case by rendering the provision of exceptions and limitations to copyright 
rights obligatory rather than voluntary.  
Other provision-specific arguments were advanced, the most notable being the one by 
the United Kingdom government, which went as far as to suggest that no ERTA effect 
had arisen as no inconsistencies exist between the Marrakesh Treaty and existing EU 
law. Clearly, amongst all the parties before the Court the UK government defended the 
narrowest reading of the ERTA doctrine.  
III. THE OPINION OF AG WAHL 
Advocate General Wahl advised the Court to recognise the exclusive nature of the 
competence of the EU to conclude the Marrakesh agreement. As will become clear when 
comparing the AG’s reasoning to that of the Court, the AG and the Court nonetheless 
took different paths to reach the same conclusion. Furthermore, as will become clear, the 
AG’s opinion contains some elements which, certainly if followed by the Court but 
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arguably also if left unaddressed by the Court, would make the Commission’s victory 
bittersweet.  
In methodological terms, the AG distinguished clearly between the existence of 
competence and its nature. He held: 
In its request, the only matter on which the Commission seeks the opinion of the 
Court is whether the European Union has exclusive competence to conclude the 
Marrakesh Treaty … However, to answer that question, it is necessary to identify 
the correct substantive legal basis (or bases) for the decision at issue. In the 
system created by the EU treaties, which is based on the principle of conferral, the 
choice of the correct legal basis for a proposed act by the institutions is of 
constitutional significance. That choice determines whether the Union has the 
power to act, for what purposes it may act and the procedure that it will have to 
follow in the event that it may act.13 
This led the AG to engage in an assessment of the different specific substantive legal 
bases proposed by the parties in the proceedings, in particular Article 207 TFEU 
(common commercial policy), Article 19(1) TFEU (non-discrimination), Article 114 TFEU 
(internal market), Article 153 TFEU (social policy) and Article 209 TFEU (development 
policy). After advising the ECJ to identify Articles 207 and 19(1) TFEU as the appropriate 
legal bases for the decision to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty, in a second part of his 
opinion the AG examined whether the EU’s competence to do so is exclusive in nature. 
Here, the AG advised the Court to recognise an ERTA effect for those aspects of the 
Treaty not covered by Article 207 TFEU - a competence which by its very nature is 
exclusive in kind.  
The existence of competence 
As will become clear below, the AG and the Court had different views on whether the 
Marrakesh Treaty ought to be understood as an international agreement falling within the 
scope of the EU’s common commercial policy. For AG Wahl, the agreement was both in 
terms of its objective and its content specifically related to international trade, and ought 
thus at least in part to be concluded on the basis of Article 207 TFEU. He argued:  
[F]ar from merely having limited implications for international trade, a large and 
important component of the Marrakesh Treaty is specifically related thereto. Its 
provisions are intended to promote, facilitate and govern trade in a specific type of 
                                                 
13
 Opinion of AG Wahl, paras 30-31. 
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goods: accessible format copies. In the overall scheme of the Marrakesh Treaty, 
the opening-up of national markets to accessible format copies from other 
countries is one of the key means of achieving the objectives pursued by the 
Contracting Parties.
14
 
Some Member State governments had argued before the Court that the content of the 
Marrakesh Treaty is specifically of a non-commercial in nature, and that the Treaty ought 
to be understood therefore as falling outside of the scope of the common commercial 
policy.
15
 The AG disagreed with this position and emphasised that the TRIPS agreement 
itself contained rules on services or goods supplied for non-commercial use - a fact that 
did not prevent the Court from characterising the entire TRIPS agreement as falling within 
the scope of the CCP in Daiichi Sankyo.
16
  
Despite the AG’s strong defence of Article 207 TFEU as an appropriate legal basis on 
which to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty, and despite his acknowledgement at the outset 
of his analysis that ‘the interpreter should strive to identify, where possible, only one or, 
failing that, the absolute minimum number of legal bases’
17
 - an acknowledgement he, 
moreover, considered ‘particularly true for international agreements which cover a 
specific area and tend to have a single, clearly defined objective’
18
 - he nonetheless 
considered Article 207 TFEU not to be sufficient. Cryptically and rather ambiguously, the 
AG held that ‘the trade-related objectives in the Marrakesh Treaty serve a purpose of a 
different nature’, which is why he took the view that Article 207 TFEU cannot be the sole 
basis of the decision at issue.
19
  
Article 19(1) TFEU provides that  
[w]ithout prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of 
the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in 
accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. 
                                                 
14
 Opinion of AG Wahl, para. 48. 
15
 See their submission as summarised in the opinion of the Court, at paras 45-46. 
16
 Opinion of AG Wahl, para. 54. 
17
 Ibid, para. 34. 
18
 Ibid, para. 35. 
19
 Ibid, para. 76. 
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The Marrakesh Treaty, the AG argued, also pursues one of the aims referred to in this 
provision, particularly the aim of combatting discrimination based on disability.
20
 
Furthermore, he considered that the Treaty’s content also has an important anti-
discrimination content.
21
 It followed that Article 19(1) TFEU also ought to be included as a 
legal basis for the conclusion of the Marrakesh Treaty. 
The other legal bases were not required, the AG held. Article 114 TFEU failed to 
qualify because no party had shown that there are significant disparities between the 
national laws of the Member States on the aspects of copyright related to the Marrakesh 
Treaty.
22
 Article 153 TFEU failed to qualify because the elements of social policy which 
the AG accepted were present in the Marrakesh Treaty nonetheless did not play a central 
role. A similar argument the AG advanced regarding Article 209 TFEU where he 
considered that a possible development policy objective is ‘purely ancillary, or at least 
secondary to the other objectives’ of the Treaty.
23
 
As the AG considered that the decision to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty ought to be 
adopted on the basis of two legal bases - Articles 207 and 19(1) TFEU - the question 
arose of the compatibility of the decision-making procedures provided for in both 
provisions. International agreements adopted based on Article 19(1) TFEU require 
parliamentary consent and unanimity in the Council. Agreements based on Article 207 
TFEU, by contrast, require parliamentary consent and a qualified majority in the Council 
to be adopted. With a reference to the International Fund for Ireland and European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund cases
24
, AG Wahl regarded these 
procedures as compatible, resulting as they would in a requirement of parliamentary 
consent coupled with unanimous approval in the Council. The AG accordingly advised the 
Court to recognise both provisions as the required substantive legal bases on which to 
conclude the Marrakesh Treaty. 
The nature of competence 
After sketching out the theory behind the ERTA doctrine, AG Wahl applied the 
doctrine to the Marrakesh Treaty. He advised the Court to recognise an ERTA effect. In 
                                                 
20
 Ibid, para. 80. 
21
 Ibid, para. 83. 
22
 Ibid, para. 92. 
23
 Ibid, para. 108. 
24
 Judgment in Parliament v Council (‘International Fund for Ireland’), C-166/07, EU:C:2009:499 
and Judgment in Commission v Council (‘European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund’), 
C-338/01, EU:C:2004:253.  
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support of this conclusion, the AG relied on the precedent established in the 
Neighbouring Rights case.
25
 In this case, he held,  
the Court observed that, as regards the international agreement in question in 
that case [i.e. the Convention of the Council of Europe on the protection of the 
rights of broadcasting organisations], the elements concerning, inter alia, the 
limitations and exceptions to the rights related to copyright were covered by 
common EU rules, and that the negotiations on those elements were capable of 
affecting or altering the scope of those common rules.
26
  
AG Wahl did not see any reason why that conclusion would not be warranted in the 
present case.  
By relying on the precedent set in Neighbouring Rights, it was not necessary for the 
AG to respond to all of the arguments made by the Member States against recognising 
an ERTA effect, in particular the arguments that relied on the premise that an ERTA 
analysis requires the Court to engage in a provision-specific inquiry. Contra this premise, 
the AG reiterated that it is sufficient for an ‘area’ to be ‘largely covered’ by common rules, 
and that a contrario no complete harmonisation is necessary for an ERTA effect to 
occur.
27
  
Relevant, in this regard, is that the AG did not engage with the ‘minimum 
harmonisation’ argument advanced by a number of Member States. As will be seen 
below, the Court did consider it necessary to address this issue. By refusing to engage 
with the matter, the AG gave the impression that in his view the minimum harmonisation 
exception to the ERTA effect was no longer good law.  
In the remainder of his opinion, the AG limited himself to rebutting specific arguments, 
as e.g. the argument advanced by the UK government according to which no ERTA effect 
had occurred as no inconsistencies exist between the Marrakesh Treaty and existing EU 
law. On this issue, the AG reminded the UK that ‘[a]s the Court has repeatedly held, EU 
rules may be affected by international commitments even if there is no possible 
contradiction between those commitments and the EU rules.’
28
 
In summary, then, AG Wahl did advise the Court to recognise the exclusive nature of 
the EU’s competence to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty. This would imply that the 
                                                 
25
 Judgment in Commission v Council (‘Neighbouring Rights’), C-114/12, EU:C:2014:2151. 
26
 Opinion of AG Wahl, para. 142. 
27
 Ibid, para. 140. 
28
 Ibid, para. 149. 
 
 
 
RGDE 
ISSN: 1696-9634, núm. 42, Mayo (2017) 160-179      Iustel 
170 
agreement could not be concluded as a mixed agreement. However, at the same time, 
firstly by advising the Court to first address the issue of the choice of legal basis, and 
secondly by advising the Court to identify not only Article 207 TFEU, but also Article 19(1) 
TFEU (and not Article 114 TFEU, as the Commission had argued), the AG did 
recommend to the Court a scenario in which unanimity within the Council would remain 
required. If retained, this arrangement would hand the Commission a bittersweet victory: 
the agreement would be adopted as an EU-only agreement, but the Member States 
would retain a veto power within the Council. Consequently, the deadlock amongst the 
Member States that has thus prevented the EU from concluding the Marrakesh Treaty 
would not be resolved.  
IV. THE OPINION OF THE GRAND CHAMBER 
In contrast to AG Wahl, who had argued that an analysis of the nature of EU 
competence first requires the Court to address the issue of the choice of legal basis, the 
Grand Chamber immediately turned to the issue of the nature of the competence of the 
EU to conclude the agreement. The Court first ruled that the EU did not have an a priori 
exclusive competence to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty, as the agreement did not fall 
within the scope of the EU’s competence to conduct a common commercial policy. By 
ruling in this sense, the Court thus arrived at a different conclusion than did its AG. In a 
second part of its opinion, the Court concluded in favour of an ERTA effect.  
As mentioned, unlike the AG, the Court did not address the issue of the choice of legal 
basis in a systematic manner. By rejecting the characterisation of the Marrakesh Treaty 
as an agreement falling within the scope of the CCP, the Court did rule out the possibility 
of adopting the decision to conclude the agreement on the basis of Article 207 TFEU. 
Beyond that, however, the Court did not clarify on which legal basis or bases the 
agreement ought to be concluded. This implies that, unless the ECJ is seized for a 
second time, the political process - i.e. the Council - will for all intents and purposes have 
the last word on the choice of legal basis issue. On a speculative note, we can assume 
this legal basis to provide for decision-making by unanimity, e.g. through an inclusion of 
Article 19(1) TFEU as recommended by the AG.    
No a priori exclusive competence 
AG Wahl characterised the Marrakesh Treaty as an agreement that specifically relates 
to international trade and thus falls within the scope of the EU’s competence to conduct a 
common commercial policy. The Grand Chamber disagreed, and instead determined that 
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neither the purpose nor the content of the Marrakesh Treaty support the proposition that 
the agreement falls within the scope of the CCP.  
Regarding the agreement’s purpose, the ECJ held that ‘the Marrakesh Treaty is, in 
essence, intended to improve the position of beneficiary persons by facilitating their 
access to published works, through various means, including the easier circulation of 
accessible format copies.’
29
 Methodologically speaking, in reaching this conclusion the 
Court relied on the title of the agreement, the recitals in the preamble and the provisions 
of the agreement. The Court did not appear to venture beyond the contours of the text of 
the agreement, e.g. by considering also the broader context in which the agreement 
came into being. In doing so, the Court here seemed to endorse AG Wahl’s view that in 
determining the objective of an agreement for the purpose of ascertaining whether an 
agreement falls within the competence of the EU to conduct a common commercial 
policy, ‘what really matters are the aim and content of the agreement, as they emerge 
from its wording.’
30
 
Also in assessing the content of the agreement the ECJ limited its analysis to the text 
of the agreement itself. Here, the Court examined separately the rules on the exceptions 
and limitations to the rights of reproduction, distribution and making available to the public 
on the one hand, and the obligations relating to the cross-border exchange of accessible 
format copies on the other.  
Regarding the former, the Court acknowledged that similar rules on conditional access 
to works protected by copyright rules have in the past been characterised as having a 
specific link with international trade. However, the different, non-commercial purpose of 
the Marrakesh Treaty distinguishes these previous cases from the rules at issue in the 
present case, the Court held.    
With regard to the latter, the Court took a similar, purpose-focussed approach and 
argued that in assessing the content of the rules governing the import and export of 
accessible format copies, ‘the objective of such rules must be taken into consideration for 
the purpose of assessing their connection with the common commercial policy.’
31
 As the 
Marrakesh Treaty has a non-commercial purpose, the contested articles cannot be 
understood as being ‘specifically intended to promote, facilitate or govern international 
trade in accessible format copies, but are rather intended to improve the position of 
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30
 Opinion of AG Wahl, para. 64. 
31
 Opinion 3/15, para. 88. 
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beneficiary persons by facilitating such persons’ access to accessible format copies 
reproduced in other Contracting Parties’, the Court held.
32
  
The Court further grounded this conclusion in an analysis of the specific 
characteristics of the of the rules on cross-border exchange of accessible format copies. 
The Court pointed inter alia to the fact that exchanges would take place between 
authorised entities, that these entities act on a non-profit basis, that only imports intended 
for beneficiary persons are covered by the Treaty provisions, and that only copies that 
have been made under a limitation or exception provided for in the Marrakesh Treaty fall 
within the scope of the rules on cross-border exchange.
33
  
As neither the purpose of the Marrakesh Treaty nor its content specifically relate to 
international trade, the Court concluded that the agreement falls outside of the scope of 
the common commercial policy. Consequently, Article 207 TFEU could not be withheld as 
a substantive legal basis for adopting the decision to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty. This 
holding immediately raises the question: which legal bases do qualify for adopting the 
decision? The Court does not address this question.   
An ERTA effect 
If the Marrakesh Treaty does not fall within the scope of the EU’s a priori exclusive 
competence, the ERTA principle comes to the forefront as an alternative avenue through 
which an exclusive EU competence can come into being. On ERTA, the Court did follow 
the Commission by concluding that the Marrakesh Treaty was covered by an ERTA effect 
and therefore fell within the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence.  
In reaching this conclusion, the Court followed the AG’s line of argument by relying on 
the precedent established in Neighbouring Rights. Both the exceptions and limitations 
and the rules governing the cross-border exchange of accessible format copies fell within 
a field harmonised by Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society.
34
 Consequently, the Marrakesh 
Treaty ought to be understood as falling within the scope of an ‘area already largely 
covered to a large extent by common EU rules, in the meaning of previous ERTA cases 
                                                 
32
 Opinion 3/15, para. 89. 
33
 Opinion 3/15, paras 91-96. 
34
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such as Neighbouring Rights, Opinion 1/13 on the Convention on the civil aspects of 
international child abduction and Opinion 1/03 on the Lugano II Convention.
35
  
As the entire Marrakesh Treaty falls within an ‘area largely covered’, the EU 
possesses an exclusive competence to conclude the Treaty. Contrary to the submission 
by the UK government, no inconsistencies between the Treaty and existing EU law are 
required, the Court clarified once again.
36
  
Particularly interesting, and to be discussed further below, is the Court’s rebuttal of the 
argument advanced by a number of Member States that the exceptions and limitations 
ought to be understood as a form of ‘minimum harmonisation’, and that therefore with 
regard to these provisions no ERTA effect had occurred. AG Wahl did not consider it 
necessary to engage with this argument: as the ‘area was largely covered’, it was not 
necessary to engage with provision-specific arguments as the one based on the 
‘minimum harmonisation’ exception, he seemed to suggest. The Court disagreed, and in 
doing so confirms that the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception remains good law, even if 
the relevant area is largely covered by common EU rules.  
As suggested by the Commission, the Grand Chamber distinguished the ‘minimum 
harmonisation’ exception introduced in Opinion 2/91 from the exceptions and limitations 
provided for in Directive 2001/29. The Court held that the latter were authorisations 
provided for by EU law. This means that the Member States may provide exceptions to 
the rights established in the Directive, but in doing so must respect EU law, in particular 
the objective of the Directive and the conditions the Directive attaches to the adoption of 
limitation and exceptions. 
This arrangement differs from the arrangement at issue in Opinion 2/91, the Court 
continued. In that opinion, the EU wished to conclude an agreement in an area within 
which the EU itself did not possess a competence to harmonise legislation fully; its 
competence was limited to setting out minimum requirements (see Article 118a EEC). By 
contrast, when enacting Directive 2001/29, the EU legislator had enacted a ‘harmonised 
legal framework.’
37
 In doing so, the EU legislator had authorised the Member States to 
provide certain limitations and exceptions. In short, in Opinion 2/91 the Member States 
acted on the basis of their own competence, whereas in Opinion 3/15 they acted as 
‘trustees’ of the EU, charged with the responsibility of implementing EU law.  
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In summary, the Grand Chamber thus, firstly, did not address the issue of the choice 
of legal basis, secondly, rejected the Commission and the AG’s argument that the 
Marrakesh Treaty falls within the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence to conduct a 
common commercial policy, and, thirdly, endorsed the Commission’s alternative line of 
argument according to which the Marrakesh Treaty, if it falls outside of the scope of the 
CCP competence, is nonetheless covered by an ERTA effect, through which the EU has 
acquired an exclusive competence to conclude the Treaty. This implies that the 
Marrakesh Treaty will not be concluded as a mixed agreement. Fourthly, and finally, the 
Court rejected the Member States’ argument that the Member States had ‘retained’ a 
competence, as the EU had only enacted a form of ‘minimum harmonisation.’  
As the Court did not determine the correct legal basis on which to conclude the Treaty, 
the question of whether decision-making within the Council ought to proceed by unanimity 
or qualified majority vote remained unanswered and will thus, most likely, be determined 
by the Council itself. In this sense, the Commission’s victory is indeed bittersweet, as it 
appears likely that the Council, bolstered by AG Wahl’s opinion, will opt to conclude the 
Marrakesh Treaty at least in part on the basis of Article 19(1) TFEU, which provides for 
unanimity within the Council. Mixity is thus off the table, but the deadlock within the 
Council remains unresolved.  
V. COMMENTARY: THE ‘MINIMUM HARMONISATION’ EXCEPTION REMAINS GOOD 
LAW 
The ECJ had introduced the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception in Opinion 2/91, 
issued in 1993.
38
 In a fashion reminiscent of its ruling in Keck & Mithouard, issued in the 
same year, where the ECJ in categorical fashion excluded ‘certain selling arrangements’ 
from the scope of application of the freedom of movement principles
39
, the Court in 
Opinion 2/91 excluded from the scope of the ERTA principle those Member State 
international commitments which provided for a higher level of protection than the level 
provided for in pre-existing common EU rules, provided that both the common EU rules 
and the international agreement set a floor while allowing both the EU and the Member 
States to set higher standards.   
The rationale of the exception was sensible: if the EU legislator itself authorises 
Member States to ‘lift the bar’ further, and if the proposed Member State international 
agreement in turn does not prevent the EU from lifting the bar further still, the Member 
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State international agreement would most likely not ‘affect common rules or alter their 
scope’ in the meaning of the ERTA principle.
40
 In other words: the full effectiveness of EU 
law would not be at risk.
41
 
The ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception was reaffirmed in Opinion 1/03 on the Lugano 
Convention, where a full court summarised the exception’s rationale by stating that ‘the 
Court did not find [in Opinion 2/91] that the Community had exclusive competence where, 
because both the Community provisions and those of an international convention laid 
down minimum standards, there was nothing to prevent the full application of Community 
law by the Member States.’
42
 
In the 2014 Neighbouring Rights case, AG Sharpston returned to the ‘minimum 
harmonisation’ exception.
43
 At issue in that case was the nature of the competence of the 
EU to negotiate and conclude a Council of Europe Convention on the protection of the 
rights of broadcasting organisations. The Commission considered the agreement covered 
by an ERTA effect because the proposed international agreement would fall within the 
scope of the acquis in the area of broadcasting rights.
44
 
The Council and a number of Member States disagreed with the Commission. They 
contested the Commission’s ‘wholesale’ approach under which it would suffice for an 
area to be ‘largely covered’ for an ERTA effect to be triggered. In the Member States and 
the Council’s view, ‘a conclusion [in favour of an ERTA effect] may be reached only after 
a precise and specific analysis of the nature and content of the EU rules concerned and 
of the relationship between those rules and the envisaged agreement which shows that 
                                                 
40
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that agreement is capable of affecting those rules or of altering their scope.’
45
 Against the 
Commission’s wholesale approach, the Member States and the Council thus advanced a 
‘retail’ approach aimed at determining whether or not specific provisions and rules are 
covered by an ERTA effect. 
Following up on a suggestion in this sense by Poland and the United Kingdom, 
Advocate General Sharpston advanced the argument that with regard to the 
retransmission of broadcasting signals the EU legislator had only provided for minimum 
standards. She argued in particular that the legislator had provided for a right of 
retransmission only with regard to retransmission by wired means; retransmission by 
wireless means was not covered. 
It followed, the AG suggested, that the Member States had retained a competence to 
provide for a higher level of protection by extending the scope of the right to 
retransmission to retransmission by wireless means. Consequently, the inclusion of such 
a right in the proposed international agreement was not liable to affect the common EU 
rules on the right to retransmission. 
The AG’s understanding of the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception fitted well with her 
broader approach to applying the ERTA principle, which aligned more closely to the retail 
approach advocated by the Council and Member States. By engaging in an analysis at 
the level of the specific rules most likely to be included in the agreement, the AG put a 
high value on protecting the limits of the EU’s competences. 
The ECJ rejected the retail reading of the ERTA doctrine. Instead of engaging in the 
type of ‘precise and specific’ analysis advocated for by the Council and the Member 
States and endorsed by AG Sharpston, the ECJ opted for the wholesale approach 
supported by the Commission. As many elements of the proposed agreement were 
already covered by common EU rules, the ECJ concluded that the proposed convention 
was covered by an ERTA effect.
46
 
On the issue of minimum harmonisation, the ECJ did not follow the AG. The Court 
distinguished Neighbouring Rights from Opinion 2/91 by repeating that in that opinion the 
EU did not have exclusive competence because both the provisions of EU law and those 
of the international convention in question laid down minimum requirements. This was not 
the case in Neighbouring Rights, as the right to retransmission provided for in common 
EU rules had a precise material scope.
47
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The Court in Neighbouring Rights did not go as far as to overturn Opinion 2/91; the 
‘minimum harmonisation’ exception remained good law. In particular, when both the 
common EU rules and the proposed international agreement - or part thereof - set out 
minimum standards, the presumption remained that the proposed agreement, or the 
relevant part of the agreement, will not affect common EU rules. In such an event, no 
ERTA effect will be triggered, and the EU does not acquire an exclusive competence. It is 
significant that this argument applies to parts of agreements, even if the agreement as a 
whole is ‘largely covered’ by common EU rules. In this sense, the ‘minimum 
harmonisation’ is a ‘retail’ exception to the ‘wholesale’ approach.    
Despite the ECJ’s rejection of the retail approach to ERTA analysis, and the rejection 
of the application of the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception proposed by AG Sharpston in 
Neighbouring Rights, in Opinion 3/15 a number of Member States (but not the Council) 
advanced an argument similar in some respects to the one advanced in Neighbouring 
Rights. 
In Opinion 3/15, as in Neighbouring Rights, the argument was made that the provision 
of exceptions to rights established in Directive 2001/29 ought to be regarded as minimum 
standards, as these exceptions left a degree of discretion to the Member States. The 
argument is similar to that by AG Sharpston in Neighbouring Rights, in the sense that in 
both instances the EU legislator was understood as excluding certain aspects from the 
scope of the rights provided by the common EU rules, the difference being that in 
Neighbouring Rights this exclusion was mandatory, while in Opinion 3/15 it was optional.  
The Member States in Opinion 3/15 went further than the AG had gone in 
Neighbouring Rights, however, as they here argued that a permission to lower the level of 
protection provided for in common EU rules ought to be regarded as a minimum 
standard. The Member States here pushed the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception 
beyond the limits of its own rationale. As mentioned, the objective of the exception as 
conceived in Opinion 2/91 was to allow for a ‘lifting of the bar’; the level of protection 
already provided for by common EU rules would not be affected in the meaning of the 
ERTA principle if a proposed international agreement provides for a higher level of 
protection while allowing the EU legislator to ‘lift the bar’ further if it wishes to do so. 
This rationale does not apply to the Member States’ argument in Opinion 3/15. 
Directive 2001/29 does not set forth minimum standards. Rather, the permission to 
provide for exceptions to the rights established in the Directive authorises the Member 
States to lower the level of protection. If they make use of this possibility, a risk that a 
proposed international agreement affects the rights set out in Directive 2001/29 arises, 
and an ERTA effect is warranted. 
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Unsurprisingly, the ECJ was not persuaded by the Member States’ reasoning. The 
Court again reaffirmed its initial understanding of the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception 
by emphasising that both the provisions of EU law and those of the international 
convention must lay down minimum requirements for the exception to apply.
48
 A 
permission to establish a lower level of protection does not fall within the scope of the 
exception.
49
  
Opinion 3/15 fits within a broader trend in the ECJ’s ERTA case law in the post-Lisbon 
era. After a period in which the ECJ interpreted the doctrine more narrowly - Opinion 1/94 
on the nature of the EU’s competence to conclude the WTO agreements being the 
clearest example
50
 - in a string of recent cases the ECJ has returned to a broader reading 
of the doctrine (see in particular Neighbouring Rights, Opinion 1/13
51
 and Green 
Network
52
). Having revived the ‘area largely covered’ test, the ECJ adopts a wholesale 
approach to its ERTA analysis in which it seeks to determine whether the scope of a 
proposed international agreement overlaps with the scope of the pre-existing acquis. In 
doing so, the Court generally does not descend to the retail level; it searches neither for 
concrete obstacles to the full effectiveness of particular EU rules, nor for actual 
contradictions between those rules and the terms of a proposed international agreement. 
The Court’s rejection of the Member States’ second attempt at advancing an overly 
broad reading of the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception in Opinion 3/15 fits within this 
broader tendency to read broadly the scope of the ERTA principle. It does so in the sense 
that while maintaining the ‘retail’ exception introduced in Opinion 2/91, the Court is careful 
to avoid the exception from expanding. By preventing the Member States (or the Council) 
from transforming the ‘minimum harmonisation’ exception into a more broadly framed 
‘retained powers’ exception, the Court indirectly protects the integrity of the wholesale-
’area largely covered’ conception of the ERTA doctrine it has defended in its recent case 
law.  
By opting for this broad reading of the ERTA principle, the ECJ places itself on a 
collision course with several Member States. For, as two members of the Council legal 
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service recently argued: ‘It appears doubtful that the Council and its Member States will 
change their position about mixity, a practice that, reinforced with provisional application, 
is founded on the fundamental principle of conferral and which in their view has proven to 
be very useful.’
53
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